Submitted by:
The International Center for Transitional Justice
P. Hayner
August 16, 2004
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the draft Act, emerging from the two-week drafting session which ended last week. We would make the following suggestions and comments, based on the experiences of truth commissions elsewhere, though recognizing that the final decision on language as well as substance should and will be made by Liberian civil society and the NTLA. Comments below are in the order of appearance in the Act:
Section 3:
2)It might be useful to the commission if the language here was a bit more precise, in order to give clear guidance. Instead of “dealing with the root causes of the crisis...” (abuses, corruption, etc.), it might be useful to say “investigate into the root causes...” I presume this is what is meant?
3) Various things:
•Here, it would seem important to include reference to violations of international humanitarian law as well as human rights violations.
• In fact, investigating “all” incidents will be (most unfortunately) impossible. Perhaps this would be better as “Investigating incidents of...” – and perhaps adding “with particular attention to those acts which constitute of a pattern of events.” This may take slight rewording of the paragraph, with the goal of not requiring the commission to undertake an investigation into every single case.
• Is the “establishment” of the TRC the date the Act is passed, the date the commissioners are inaugurated, or the date they formally begin work? Perhaps precision here would be useful so that this is clear to all.
• The reference to “economic crimes” (and especially as the commission is called to “investigate all incidences of...”) raises the question of how far-reaching this is intended to be? Perhaps some guidance could be provided as to whether it is really intended that all allegations of corruption, for example, should be investigated by the TRC? This could potentially make its job nearly impossible, and also mire it is political difficulties pertaining to allegations of corruption that have occurred since the signing of the Accra accord.
Section 5:
Experience elsewhere would suggest that a request for an extension to a truth commission’s work would likely take place quite late in the commission’s work. It is not clear what timing is intended here, but it might be advantageous to allow an extension to be granted “for good cause, as shown by the commission in a written request to the National Legislature” – rather than requiring such a request to be part of a semi-annual report.
Section 6:
It is possible the commission might want to open an office or branch overseas (such as to take statements from Liberians based abroad); it might be useful therefore to change this language to say that offices or branches may be opened “elsewhere” (rather than “in other parts of Liberia”), at the discretion of the commission.
Section 8:
Who is the entity or authority who decides what individuals are to be appointed to the selection panel from civil society, political parties, and the UN? Ideally, this Act could identify specific appointing organizations or individuals, such as: “the Transitional Justice Working group shall appoint one; the xxx of civil society shall appoint one; the chairs of all registered political parties shall jointly appoint two; the UN SRSG, in consultation with UNMIL’s human rights unit, shall appoint one.” Or something along those lines.
Section 9:
Two things:
• Does this mean that ECOWAS would help the civil society organizations appoint their representatives to the selection panel? This seems a bit awkward, in part because it requires the ECOWAS person to be identified and in place before civil society can identify its appointees (unless this is not what is meant here).
• Is it intended that people can “apply” to be commissioners? Perhaps better language would be “nominations” rather than “applications”?
Section 10:
I presume it is intentional that the Act does not repeat the language of the CPA, requiring members to be part of “Liberian society”?
Section 11:
The intention here is right, as to excluding known politically partisan individuals, but the language might unintentionally exclude anyone who has known political allegiances, which could be too strict of a requirement (given that most people might reasonably be members of a political party, for example). Perhaps, rather than “non-partisan” and “above political alignments,” it might be preferable to say “persons who have not had a strongly partisan public profile,” or something along those lines.
Section 15:
I would be curious what is intended by the language which places its “work and the functions...second only to matters emanating from the National Elections Commission.” If this intent is to be sure the TRC does not complicate matters for elections, then perhaps this could be more narrow and specific, such as “the commission may modify the public aspects of its activities, and the public release of its report, in respect of election periods; these considerations will be undertaken in consultation with the NEC.” The more sweeping language in this current draft leaves open a much broader and unintended interference by the NEC, which would be unfortunate.
Section 16:
Perhaps it is unrealistic to mandate that the full resources, authority, and capacity of the government are at the disposal of the TRC (which infers that the government’s financial resources are without limit at the disposal of the commission, for example). What could be intended in this section, and would indeed be important, might be that “the government shall provide financial support to the commission and provide full access to information and expertise at its disposal,” or something along those lines.
Section 21:
d) We would suggest that this language be slightly revised so that the amnesty could not be applied to “serious violations of international humanitarian law and crimes against humanity.” This is in keeping with the UN guidelines and other international standards as to crimes that cannot be amnestied.
Might it also be useful to limit any amnesties to acts associated with the armed conflict?
Section 29:
Past experience strongly suggests that a truth commission itself is best placed to recommend reparations, rather than try to create a fund and try to implement a reparations program. We would suggest changing this section to recommending powers, rather than actually creating a fund and identifying beneficiaries.
Section 30:
The commission would be better placed if it did not have to report on a semi-annual basis – unless this is limited to financial reporting or perhaps basic progress reporting. (Furthermore, it is unclear if this says that the report of the commission shall be published in three local dailies? Is this a reasonable expectation or requirement – especially given that the report is likely to be very lengthy? Perhaps change this to “the announcement and availability of the report will be published in three dailies,” or “key findings from the report will be published...”
Section 35:
What is intended by this paragraph, which suggests that the report “shall assume the character of national law”? This seems confusing and undesirable, given that the report will not likely be written in a style that would be conducive or appropriate for legislation.
General comment: We think that the Act is well-crafted in its current structure, and in fact it works well to not include a definitions section. Indeed, trying to define many of the concepts and ideas included in the Act would likely unintentionally limit the commission’s work. As has been seen by previous truth commissions, most of the concepts here are best left for closer definition by the commission itself.
Thursday, March 29, 2007
UNICEF Recommendations: Participation and Protection of Children in the Liberia TRC Process
Key Principles:
• Best interests of the child guides the entire process.
• Children must be treated with dignity and respect.
• Any participation of children is voluntary, on the basis of informed consent by child and parent/guardian. There should be no power of subpoena for children.
• Safety and security of all child statement givers is paramount, including protection of children’s physical, spiritual and psychological well-being.
• Determine child’s eligibility to give statement based on i) vulnerability assessment, and ii) safety check list.
• Child friendly environment for statement giving, one-on-one unless child requests the presence of a social worker and/or family member or guardian. There should be no public disclosure or group discussion or direct engagement with an alleged perpetrator.
• Girls interviewed by female statement takers unless they choose otherwise.
• Confidentiality and anonymity of the child guaranteed and no sharing of information with outside body, including judicial mechanisms.
• Psychosocial support provided before, during and in follow up to the process of statement taking.
• All statement takers and social workers to receive training in child rights and child protection.
• No TRC has created a judicial link or exercised judicial powers with respect to children. It is strongly urged that judicial measures are not used by the TRC in its involvement with children.
• Under no condition should the child’s statement or testimony be shared with any judicial body.
Recommendations for Statement Taking:
• With respect to children, the statement taking should be considered as the child telling the story of what happened, recounting their experience.
• Equal treatment of all children coming before the Commission with all children to be treated as witnesses.
• Representative participation, to the extent possible, including geographical balance, diverse experience of children, range of violations suffered, roles played, political affiliation, and equal representation of girls.
• Quality of statements and treatment of children is more important than the quantity of statements obtained.
• CPAs and other groups with experience in working with children to assist in statement taking: i) overall guidance, ii) identifying children, iii) facilitating access to children by TRC, iv) psychosocial support available for children before, during, after statement taking, as well as follow up visits.
• Before participating, all children should be informed: i) Purpose and objectives of the TRC, ii) Confidentiality of their involvement, iii) Their role in the TRC and what their involvement will achieve, iv) Role of statement taker, v) Timeframe.
• No fixed minimum age is recommended but participation should depend on the child’s maturity and evolving capacity, taking into consideration, i) willingness to provide a statement, ii) Understanding the purpose of giving the statement, iii) ability to deal with the emotional impact.
Recommendations for child-friendly environment:
• Familiar environment (in a school, recreation centre or religious centre) that is quiet and safe.
• Informal setting, with child and statement taker sitting at the same level.
• Time allowed at the beginning to establish a friendly relationship between statement taker and child.
• Interview conducted in the child’s language.
Recommendations for interview:
• Begin with introduction, who is the interviewer, explain purpose and ask permission to record the statement. No oath should be requested.
• Friendly, informal, relaxed approach.
• Be respectful, do not judge the child.
• Use language and concepts appropriate to the child’s age.
• Allow the child to tell her or his story in their own way, give enough time without rushing or impatience.
• Ask open-ended questions. For example, i) what happened, ii) when did the events happen, iii) where did the events happen, iv) who was responsible, v) do you know why the events happened, vi) what effect did the events have on you, vii) what happened to your family, viii) did anyone try to help, ix) what should be done to make sure the events never happen again, x) what else do you remember, xi) is there something more you would like to say.
• Do not ask several questions in the same sentence, ask questions one at a time.
• Do not ask leading questions that are answered by “yes” or “no”.
• It is acceptable to ask the child to clarify or explain but the child should not be cross examined.
• Do not repeat questions or put pressure on the child if they are not able or willing to provide information or do not wish to speak about an issue or an event. Never force a child to talk.
• Do not interrupt.
• The interview should not exceed one hour, including a 10 minute break, for children aged 12 and over. If the time is inadequate and the child wishes, then a second interview could be scheduled. If the child is below 12 years, then the interview should not exceed 45 minutes.
• The child should be able to ask questions.
• If the child is upset or distressed, take or break or suspend the interview. If the child wishes to end the interview before it is completed, then it should be terminated.
• The social worker (or parent/friend/guardian) should be available to provide support to the child following the interview.
• Best interests of the child guides the entire process.
• Children must be treated with dignity and respect.
• Any participation of children is voluntary, on the basis of informed consent by child and parent/guardian. There should be no power of subpoena for children.
• Safety and security of all child statement givers is paramount, including protection of children’s physical, spiritual and psychological well-being.
• Determine child’s eligibility to give statement based on i) vulnerability assessment, and ii) safety check list.
• Child friendly environment for statement giving, one-on-one unless child requests the presence of a social worker and/or family member or guardian. There should be no public disclosure or group discussion or direct engagement with an alleged perpetrator.
• Girls interviewed by female statement takers unless they choose otherwise.
• Confidentiality and anonymity of the child guaranteed and no sharing of information with outside body, including judicial mechanisms.
• Psychosocial support provided before, during and in follow up to the process of statement taking.
• All statement takers and social workers to receive training in child rights and child protection.
• No TRC has created a judicial link or exercised judicial powers with respect to children. It is strongly urged that judicial measures are not used by the TRC in its involvement with children.
• Under no condition should the child’s statement or testimony be shared with any judicial body.
Recommendations for Statement Taking:
• With respect to children, the statement taking should be considered as the child telling the story of what happened, recounting their experience.
• Equal treatment of all children coming before the Commission with all children to be treated as witnesses.
• Representative participation, to the extent possible, including geographical balance, diverse experience of children, range of violations suffered, roles played, political affiliation, and equal representation of girls.
• Quality of statements and treatment of children is more important than the quantity of statements obtained.
• CPAs and other groups with experience in working with children to assist in statement taking: i) overall guidance, ii) identifying children, iii) facilitating access to children by TRC, iv) psychosocial support available for children before, during, after statement taking, as well as follow up visits.
• Before participating, all children should be informed: i) Purpose and objectives of the TRC, ii) Confidentiality of their involvement, iii) Their role in the TRC and what their involvement will achieve, iv) Role of statement taker, v) Timeframe.
• No fixed minimum age is recommended but participation should depend on the child’s maturity and evolving capacity, taking into consideration, i) willingness to provide a statement, ii) Understanding the purpose of giving the statement, iii) ability to deal with the emotional impact.
Recommendations for child-friendly environment:
• Familiar environment (in a school, recreation centre or religious centre) that is quiet and safe.
• Informal setting, with child and statement taker sitting at the same level.
• Time allowed at the beginning to establish a friendly relationship between statement taker and child.
• Interview conducted in the child’s language.
Recommendations for interview:
• Begin with introduction, who is the interviewer, explain purpose and ask permission to record the statement. No oath should be requested.
• Friendly, informal, relaxed approach.
• Be respectful, do not judge the child.
• Use language and concepts appropriate to the child’s age.
• Allow the child to tell her or his story in their own way, give enough time without rushing or impatience.
• Ask open-ended questions. For example, i) what happened, ii) when did the events happen, iii) where did the events happen, iv) who was responsible, v) do you know why the events happened, vi) what effect did the events have on you, vii) what happened to your family, viii) did anyone try to help, ix) what should be done to make sure the events never happen again, x) what else do you remember, xi) is there something more you would like to say.
• Do not ask several questions in the same sentence, ask questions one at a time.
• Do not ask leading questions that are answered by “yes” or “no”.
• It is acceptable to ask the child to clarify or explain but the child should not be cross examined.
• Do not repeat questions or put pressure on the child if they are not able or willing to provide information or do not wish to speak about an issue or an event. Never force a child to talk.
• Do not interrupt.
• The interview should not exceed one hour, including a 10 minute break, for children aged 12 and over. If the time is inadequate and the child wishes, then a second interview could be scheduled. If the child is below 12 years, then the interview should not exceed 45 minutes.
• The child should be able to ask questions.
• If the child is upset or distressed, take or break or suspend the interview. If the child wishes to end the interview before it is completed, then it should be terminated.
• The social worker (or parent/friend/guardian) should be available to provide support to the child following the interview.
THE PREVENTABLE GENOCIDE: WHAT THE WORLD COULD HAVE DONE?
Now 'our' April is here, I thought I would share this excerpt from the G. Kaplan, S. Lewis report.
10.1. If there is anything worse than the genocide itself, it is the knowledge that it did not have to happen. The simple, harsh, truth is that the genocide was not inevitable; and that it would have been relatively easy to stop it from happening prior to April 6, 1994, and then to mitigate the destruction significantly once it began. In the words of one expert, 'This was the most easily preventable genocide imaginable.'
10.2. The conspirators may have seemed formidable in local terms, but in fact they were small in number, modestly armed, and substantially dependent on the outside world. On the few occasions when the world did protest against the human rights violations being perpetrated, the abuses largely halted, if temporarily. This has been documented thoroughly. Conversely, each time the world appeased the latest outrage, it enhanced the sense of Hutu Power impunity. Since no one was ever punished for massacres or human rights abuses, since the Habyarimana government remained a favourite recipient of foreign aid, and since no one demanded an end to the escalating incitement against the Tutsi, why would Hutu radicals not believe they could get away with just about anything? [2]
10.3. The plot leaders were in it for the spoils. Even a hint, let alone a threat that further aid or loans or arms would not be forthcoming was taken very seriously indeed. Such threats were invoked with success to force Habyarimana to sign the Arusha accords. They were rarely made in connection with human rights abuses or ethnic persecution, however, and when they were, the threats were never followed up, reflecting the reality that human rights were not high on the agendas of many foreign governments.
10.4. Beyond this, some outsiders were blinded by their faith in multipartyism as a panacea for all Rwanda's woes. The atrocities aimed at the Tutsi were mistaken for more violence flowing from the civil war. End the civil war and implement the Arusha accords, they reasoned, and ethnic violence will automatically stop. To forward the goal of peace, it was necessary to remain engaged. Withdrawal of aid was therefore seen as counter-productive.
10.5. Few bothered to learn the lesson from Arusha's utter failure that no agreement mattered unless Hutu Power was shattered. Precisely the same crucial analytical error was repeated throughout the period from April to July, when the Security Council and the United Nations Secretariat consistently took the position that ending the civil war took primacy over ending the genocide. When the Nigerian ambassador complained that too much attention was being paid to cease-fire negotiations and too little to stopping the massacres, he was largely ignored. The Carlsson Inquiry, appointed by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 1999 to look into the role of the UN in the genocide, criticizes the entire U N family for this 'costly error of judgment.'[3] In fact, this seems to us too generous an interpretation of the world's failure.
10.6. Here was a clear-cut case of rote diplomacy by the international community. As the UN's own Department of Peacekeeping Operations later concluded, 'A fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the conflict contributed to false political assumptions and military assessments.'[4] Security Council members blithely ignored both the discrete realities of the situation and the urgent advocacy of the non-governmental agencies who were crying out the truth to whomever would listen.[5] Instead, the automatic reflex was to call for a cease-fire and negotiations, outcomes that would have coincided perfectly with the aims and strategy of the genocidaires. The annihilation of the Tutsi would have continued, while the war between the armies paused, and negotiators wrangled. In reality, anything that slowed the march of the RPF to military victory was a gift to Hutu Power. In the end, its victory alone ended the genocide and saved those Tutsi who were still alive by July. We count Rwanda fortunate that a military truce - the single consistent initiative pursued by the international community - was never reached.
10.7. It should only have taken the information at hand to formulate a correct response. It may well be that the mass media did not at first grasp the full extent of the genocide, but that was not true of the world's decision-makers. Eyewitness accounts were never lacking, whether from Rwandans or expatriates with the International Committee for the Red Cross, Human Rights Watch, the US Committee for Refugees, or others. Week after week for three months, reports sent directly from Rwanda to home governments and international agencies documented the magnitude of the slaughter and made it plain that this was no tribal bloodletting, but the work of hardline political and military leaders. At the same time, the reports spelled how countless people could still be saved, identifying exactly where they were hiding, and what steps were needed to rescue them. Yet the world did less than nothing. As subsequent chapters fully document, the world powers assembled as the UN Security Council actually chose to reduce, rather than enhance, their presence.
10.8. The obvious, necessary response was a serious international military force to deter the killers; this seems to us a self-evident truth. This Panel wants to go on record as one that shares the conviction of UN Assistance Mission to Rwanda ( UNAMIR) Commander General Romeo Dallaire: "The killings could have been prevented if there had been the international will to accept the costs of doing so." [6] As we have seen, that will was at best half-hearted before April 6, and it collapsed entirely in the early stages of the genocide. Virtually every authority we know believes that a larger, better-equipped, and toughly mandated force could have played a critical role, possibly in deterring the conspiracy entirely or, at the least, in causing the plotters to modify or stall their plans and in significantly reducing the number of deaths. It seems certain that appropriate UN intervention at any time after the genocide began would have had a major role in stopping the killings.[7]
10.9. Dallaire has always insisted that with 5,000 troops and the right mandate, UNAMIR could have prevented most of the killings. In 1998, several American institutions decided to test Dallaire's argument. The Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C., and the US Army undertook a joint project to consider what impact an international military force was likely to have had.[8] Thirteen senior military leaders addressed the issue, and a report based on their presentations as well as on other research, was prepared for the Carnegie Commission by Colonel Scott Feil of the US Army. His conclusion was straightforward: "A modern force of 5,000 troops...sent to Rwanda sometime between April 7 and April 21, 1994, could have significantly altered the outcome of the conflict... forces appropriately trained, equipped and commanded, and introduced in a timely manner, could have stemmed the violence in and around the capital, prevented its spread to the countryside, and created conditions conducive to the cessation of the civil war between the RPF and RGF." [9]
10.10. Of course, we understand that this was a strictly theoretical exercise, and it is easy to be wise after the fact. On the other hand, we have no reason to question the objectivity of this analysis or of any of the participants. Neither they nor the author seem to have had a vested interest in this conclusion. Moreover, even those analyses that have recently stressed the logistic complications in swiftly mobilizing a properly equipped force do not deny that scores of thousands of Tutsi, 'up to 125,000,' might have been saved at any time during the months of the genocide.[10] By any standard, these American reports stand as a humiliating rebuke to the US government whose influence was so great in ensuring that no adequate force ever was sent.
10.11. Rather than respond with appropriate force, the opposite happened, spurred by the murders of the Belgian Blue Berets and Belgium's withdrawal of its remaining troops. Exactly two weeks after the genocide began - following strenuous lobbying for total withdrawal led by Belgium and Britain, and with American UN Ambassador Madeleine Albright advocating the most token of forces and the United States adamantly refusing to accept publicly that a full-fledged, Convention-defined genocide was in fact taking place – the Security Council made the astonishing decision to reduce the already inadequate UNAMIR force to a derisory 270 men.[11]
10.12. Today, it seems barely possible to believe. The international community actually chose to abandon the Tutsi of Rwanda at the very moment when they were being exterminated. Even that was not the end of it. The UN Secretariat officials then instructed General Dallaire that his rump force was not to take an active role in protecting Rwandan citizens.[12] To his great credit, Dallaire maneuvered to keep the force at almost twice the size authorized, and UNAMIR was still able to save the lives of an estimated 20,000 to 25,000 Rwandans during the course of the genocide.[13]
10.13. In a sense, the fact that it was possible to save thousands of lives with 500 troops makes the Belgian and the UN decisions much more deplorable. The available evidence reveals the considerable authority exerted after April 6 by even a small number of Blue Helmets with a UN flag. 'The general rule' was that 'Rwandans were safe as long as they gathered under United Nations protection ... It was when the United Nations forces left the site that the killings started'.[14] This rule was most infamously demonstrated in the case of the Kigali technical school, l'Ecole Technique Officielle (ETO), where 100 Belgian soldiers kept a horde of murderers at bay. As the UN troops withdrew through one gate, the genocidaires moved in through another. Within hours, the 2,000 Tutsi who had fled to ETO for UN protection were dead.[15] We will return to this shocking incident later in this report.
10.14. With the exception of the deliberate murders of the 10 Belgian Blue Helmets, experiences showed that a few UN troops could provide significant defense for those under their protection with little risk to themselves. This "power of presence" was not to be underestimated. Yet when France sent 500 soldiers to evacuate French citizens and Akazu members on April 8 and 9, Dallaire's UN troops were immediately ordered - by the Secretariat in New York, and under strong pressure from western countries - to work with the French to evacuate foreign nationals rather than protect threatened Rwandans.[16] This can only be described as a truly perverse use of scarce UN resources. No doubt innocent expatriates were threatened by a conflagration that was none of their making. But exactly the same was true of Rwanda's Tutsi, who were peremptorily abandoned by the Blue Helmets.
10.15. Equally startling were the guidelines Dallaire was given. These seem to have received little notice until documented by the Carlsson Inquiry report, yet they seem to us of extraordinary significance. 'You should make every effort not to compromise your impartiality or to act beyond your mandate,' the April 9 cable from Kofi Annan and Iqbal Riza stated, 'but [you] may exercise your discretion to do [so] should this be essential for the evacuation of foreign nationals. This should not, repeat not, extend to participating in possible combat except in self-defence.'[17] This double standard seems to us outrageous. No such instructions were ever given to Dallaire about protecting innocent Rwandan civilians. He was never explicitly directed that the Blue Helmets should protect such civilians and could fight in self-defence if attacked while doing so. He was never told, 'exercise your discretion...to act beyond your mandate' when it came to Rwandans. On the contrary, every time he raised the issue, he was specifically instructed not to go beyond the rigidly circumscribed mandate approved by the Security Council under any circumstances. Is there a conclusion we can draw from this incident other than that expatriate lives were considered more valuable than African lives?
10.16. The lesson to be learned from the betrayal at ETO and other experiences was that the full potential of UNAMIR went unexplored and unused, and, as result, countless more Rwandans died than otherwise might have. If anyone in the international community learned this lesson at the time, it was not evident at the UN. For the next six weeks, as the carnage continued, the UN dithered in organizing any kind of response to the ongoing tragedy. The Americans, led by US Ambassador Madeleine Albright, played the key role in blocking more expeditious action by the UN.[18] On May 17, the Security Council finally authorized an expanded UNAMIR II to consist of 5,500 personnel.[19] But there is perhaps no distance greater on earth than the one between the Security Council chambers and the outside world. Once the decision to expand was finally made, as we will soon show in detail, the Pentagon somehow required an additional seven weeks just to negotiate a contract for delivering armed personnel carriers to the field; evidently it proved difficult to arrange the desired terms for "maintenance and spare parts."[20] When the genocide ended in mid-July with the final RPF victory, not a single additional UN soldier had landed in Kigali.
10.1. If there is anything worse than the genocide itself, it is the knowledge that it did not have to happen. The simple, harsh, truth is that the genocide was not inevitable; and that it would have been relatively easy to stop it from happening prior to April 6, 1994, and then to mitigate the destruction significantly once it began. In the words of one expert, 'This was the most easily preventable genocide imaginable.'
10.2. The conspirators may have seemed formidable in local terms, but in fact they were small in number, modestly armed, and substantially dependent on the outside world. On the few occasions when the world did protest against the human rights violations being perpetrated, the abuses largely halted, if temporarily. This has been documented thoroughly. Conversely, each time the world appeased the latest outrage, it enhanced the sense of Hutu Power impunity. Since no one was ever punished for massacres or human rights abuses, since the Habyarimana government remained a favourite recipient of foreign aid, and since no one demanded an end to the escalating incitement against the Tutsi, why would Hutu radicals not believe they could get away with just about anything? [2]
10.3. The plot leaders were in it for the spoils. Even a hint, let alone a threat that further aid or loans or arms would not be forthcoming was taken very seriously indeed. Such threats were invoked with success to force Habyarimana to sign the Arusha accords. They were rarely made in connection with human rights abuses or ethnic persecution, however, and when they were, the threats were never followed up, reflecting the reality that human rights were not high on the agendas of many foreign governments.
10.4. Beyond this, some outsiders were blinded by their faith in multipartyism as a panacea for all Rwanda's woes. The atrocities aimed at the Tutsi were mistaken for more violence flowing from the civil war. End the civil war and implement the Arusha accords, they reasoned, and ethnic violence will automatically stop. To forward the goal of peace, it was necessary to remain engaged. Withdrawal of aid was therefore seen as counter-productive.
10.5. Few bothered to learn the lesson from Arusha's utter failure that no agreement mattered unless Hutu Power was shattered. Precisely the same crucial analytical error was repeated throughout the period from April to July, when the Security Council and the United Nations Secretariat consistently took the position that ending the civil war took primacy over ending the genocide. When the Nigerian ambassador complained that too much attention was being paid to cease-fire negotiations and too little to stopping the massacres, he was largely ignored. The Carlsson Inquiry, appointed by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 1999 to look into the role of the UN in the genocide, criticizes the entire U N family for this 'costly error of judgment.'[3] In fact, this seems to us too generous an interpretation of the world's failure.
10.6. Here was a clear-cut case of rote diplomacy by the international community. As the UN's own Department of Peacekeeping Operations later concluded, 'A fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the conflict contributed to false political assumptions and military assessments.'[4] Security Council members blithely ignored both the discrete realities of the situation and the urgent advocacy of the non-governmental agencies who were crying out the truth to whomever would listen.[5] Instead, the automatic reflex was to call for a cease-fire and negotiations, outcomes that would have coincided perfectly with the aims and strategy of the genocidaires. The annihilation of the Tutsi would have continued, while the war between the armies paused, and negotiators wrangled. In reality, anything that slowed the march of the RPF to military victory was a gift to Hutu Power. In the end, its victory alone ended the genocide and saved those Tutsi who were still alive by July. We count Rwanda fortunate that a military truce - the single consistent initiative pursued by the international community - was never reached.
10.7. It should only have taken the information at hand to formulate a correct response. It may well be that the mass media did not at first grasp the full extent of the genocide, but that was not true of the world's decision-makers. Eyewitness accounts were never lacking, whether from Rwandans or expatriates with the International Committee for the Red Cross, Human Rights Watch, the US Committee for Refugees, or others. Week after week for three months, reports sent directly from Rwanda to home governments and international agencies documented the magnitude of the slaughter and made it plain that this was no tribal bloodletting, but the work of hardline political and military leaders. At the same time, the reports spelled how countless people could still be saved, identifying exactly where they were hiding, and what steps were needed to rescue them. Yet the world did less than nothing. As subsequent chapters fully document, the world powers assembled as the UN Security Council actually chose to reduce, rather than enhance, their presence.
10.8. The obvious, necessary response was a serious international military force to deter the killers; this seems to us a self-evident truth. This Panel wants to go on record as one that shares the conviction of UN Assistance Mission to Rwanda ( UNAMIR) Commander General Romeo Dallaire: "The killings could have been prevented if there had been the international will to accept the costs of doing so." [6] As we have seen, that will was at best half-hearted before April 6, and it collapsed entirely in the early stages of the genocide. Virtually every authority we know believes that a larger, better-equipped, and toughly mandated force could have played a critical role, possibly in deterring the conspiracy entirely or, at the least, in causing the plotters to modify or stall their plans and in significantly reducing the number of deaths. It seems certain that appropriate UN intervention at any time after the genocide began would have had a major role in stopping the killings.[7]
10.9. Dallaire has always insisted that with 5,000 troops and the right mandate, UNAMIR could have prevented most of the killings. In 1998, several American institutions decided to test Dallaire's argument. The Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C., and the US Army undertook a joint project to consider what impact an international military force was likely to have had.[8] Thirteen senior military leaders addressed the issue, and a report based on their presentations as well as on other research, was prepared for the Carnegie Commission by Colonel Scott Feil of the US Army. His conclusion was straightforward: "A modern force of 5,000 troops...sent to Rwanda sometime between April 7 and April 21, 1994, could have significantly altered the outcome of the conflict... forces appropriately trained, equipped and commanded, and introduced in a timely manner, could have stemmed the violence in and around the capital, prevented its spread to the countryside, and created conditions conducive to the cessation of the civil war between the RPF and RGF." [9]
10.10. Of course, we understand that this was a strictly theoretical exercise, and it is easy to be wise after the fact. On the other hand, we have no reason to question the objectivity of this analysis or of any of the participants. Neither they nor the author seem to have had a vested interest in this conclusion. Moreover, even those analyses that have recently stressed the logistic complications in swiftly mobilizing a properly equipped force do not deny that scores of thousands of Tutsi, 'up to 125,000,' might have been saved at any time during the months of the genocide.[10] By any standard, these American reports stand as a humiliating rebuke to the US government whose influence was so great in ensuring that no adequate force ever was sent.
10.11. Rather than respond with appropriate force, the opposite happened, spurred by the murders of the Belgian Blue Berets and Belgium's withdrawal of its remaining troops. Exactly two weeks after the genocide began - following strenuous lobbying for total withdrawal led by Belgium and Britain, and with American UN Ambassador Madeleine Albright advocating the most token of forces and the United States adamantly refusing to accept publicly that a full-fledged, Convention-defined genocide was in fact taking place – the Security Council made the astonishing decision to reduce the already inadequate UNAMIR force to a derisory 270 men.[11]
10.12. Today, it seems barely possible to believe. The international community actually chose to abandon the Tutsi of Rwanda at the very moment when they were being exterminated. Even that was not the end of it. The UN Secretariat officials then instructed General Dallaire that his rump force was not to take an active role in protecting Rwandan citizens.[12] To his great credit, Dallaire maneuvered to keep the force at almost twice the size authorized, and UNAMIR was still able to save the lives of an estimated 20,000 to 25,000 Rwandans during the course of the genocide.[13]
10.13. In a sense, the fact that it was possible to save thousands of lives with 500 troops makes the Belgian and the UN decisions much more deplorable. The available evidence reveals the considerable authority exerted after April 6 by even a small number of Blue Helmets with a UN flag. 'The general rule' was that 'Rwandans were safe as long as they gathered under United Nations protection ... It was when the United Nations forces left the site that the killings started'.[14] This rule was most infamously demonstrated in the case of the Kigali technical school, l'Ecole Technique Officielle (ETO), where 100 Belgian soldiers kept a horde of murderers at bay. As the UN troops withdrew through one gate, the genocidaires moved in through another. Within hours, the 2,000 Tutsi who had fled to ETO for UN protection were dead.[15] We will return to this shocking incident later in this report.
10.14. With the exception of the deliberate murders of the 10 Belgian Blue Helmets, experiences showed that a few UN troops could provide significant defense for those under their protection with little risk to themselves. This "power of presence" was not to be underestimated. Yet when France sent 500 soldiers to evacuate French citizens and Akazu members on April 8 and 9, Dallaire's UN troops were immediately ordered - by the Secretariat in New York, and under strong pressure from western countries - to work with the French to evacuate foreign nationals rather than protect threatened Rwandans.[16] This can only be described as a truly perverse use of scarce UN resources. No doubt innocent expatriates were threatened by a conflagration that was none of their making. But exactly the same was true of Rwanda's Tutsi, who were peremptorily abandoned by the Blue Helmets.
10.15. Equally startling were the guidelines Dallaire was given. These seem to have received little notice until documented by the Carlsson Inquiry report, yet they seem to us of extraordinary significance. 'You should make every effort not to compromise your impartiality or to act beyond your mandate,' the April 9 cable from Kofi Annan and Iqbal Riza stated, 'but [you] may exercise your discretion to do [so] should this be essential for the evacuation of foreign nationals. This should not, repeat not, extend to participating in possible combat except in self-defence.'[17] This double standard seems to us outrageous. No such instructions were ever given to Dallaire about protecting innocent Rwandan civilians. He was never explicitly directed that the Blue Helmets should protect such civilians and could fight in self-defence if attacked while doing so. He was never told, 'exercise your discretion...to act beyond your mandate' when it came to Rwandans. On the contrary, every time he raised the issue, he was specifically instructed not to go beyond the rigidly circumscribed mandate approved by the Security Council under any circumstances. Is there a conclusion we can draw from this incident other than that expatriate lives were considered more valuable than African lives?
10.16. The lesson to be learned from the betrayal at ETO and other experiences was that the full potential of UNAMIR went unexplored and unused, and, as result, countless more Rwandans died than otherwise might have. If anyone in the international community learned this lesson at the time, it was not evident at the UN. For the next six weeks, as the carnage continued, the UN dithered in organizing any kind of response to the ongoing tragedy. The Americans, led by US Ambassador Madeleine Albright, played the key role in blocking more expeditious action by the UN.[18] On May 17, the Security Council finally authorized an expanded UNAMIR II to consist of 5,500 personnel.[19] But there is perhaps no distance greater on earth than the one between the Security Council chambers and the outside world. Once the decision to expand was finally made, as we will soon show in detail, the Pentagon somehow required an additional seven weeks just to negotiate a contract for delivering armed personnel carriers to the field; evidently it proved difficult to arrange the desired terms for "maintenance and spare parts."[20] When the genocide ended in mid-July with the final RPF victory, not a single additional UN soldier had landed in Kigali.
Youths petition for war crimes court
LIBERIA: Youths petition for war crimes court
MONROVIA, 11 April (IRIN) - With one-time rebel leader and former Liberian president Charles Taylor before a war crimes court in neighbouring Sierra Leone some Liberian youths have begun petitioning their government to set up their own tribunal.
Rebel fighters, many of them children and youths high on drugs and clad in women's wigs and underwear, killed, raped and maimed during 14 years of on-off civil war that ended when Taylor quit power and took exile in August 2003.
But Taylor's days in a seafront mansion courtesy of the Nigerian government abruptly came to an end last month after a rapid succession of developments that culminated with UN peacekeepers handing a cuffed Taylor over to the UN-backed Special Court in Sierra Leone.
Back in Liberia there is an elected government, security is guaranteed by a 15,000-strong UN peacekeeping force and donors are stumping up millions of dollars to rebuild the war-battered country.
And part of that rebuilding must include a war crimes court, say youth groups who want to see the perpetrators of crimes including summary executions, massacres, amputations and rape brought to justice.
"Justice for the people of Liberia can no longer be delayed or denied. The time has come to establish an international criminal tribunal for Liberia," said the Forum for the Establishment of a War Crimes court in Liberia (FEWCCIL) on its petition which they say has received 10,000 signatures of support.
The FEWCCIL last week took the matter to the 94-members of Liberia's newly installed elected government.
"In the interests of genuine lasting peace and reconciliation we call upon this august body to pass an act that establishes the legal framework for the creation of a Special War Crimes Tribunal for Liberia," the FEWCCIL told parliament.
A second group, the Confederation of Monrovia Youth (CMY) told legislatures such a court would end Liberia's culture of impunity.
"Bringing the perpetrators of gruesome atrocities to court would serve as a deterrent to others and end the culture of impunity that exists in this country," the CMY said.
A peace deal thrashed out in the run up to Taylor's 2003 departure called for the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission but Taylor's henchmen and rebel leaders who signed the deal fell short of agreeing to the establishment of a war crimes court.
Liberia's Truth and Reconciliation Commission was officially launched in late February and is mandated to "investigate gross human rights violations and war crimes, including massacres, sexual violence, murder, extra-judicial killings and economic crimes (such as the exploitation of national or public resources to perpetuate the armed conflict)," reads the June 2005 law ratifying the Commission.
The Commission, headed by Liberian human rights activist Jerome Verdier, will begin hearings in July to make a public record of atrocities committed as far back as 1979 – ten years prior to the start of the civil war. Based on their investigations, the Commission cannot try alleged offenders but has the power to recommend cases for prosecution.
Verdier dismissed the calls for a Liberian war crimes court, saying that the calls were being made by people "not well informed of the trend in the peace process."
Talk of a war crimes court has rung alarm bells for others. Sekou Conneh, leader of the largest rebel group – the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) – in the final years of the civil war, denounced the move telling IRIN that "digging up old wounds" would do more harm than good.
"Nearly everyone in this country is guilty of war crimes and we strongly believe that a [war crimes] court would not be in line with restoring peace in Liberia. Frankly, it is not necessary here," said Conneh who also ran unsuccessfully as a presidential candidate in the first round of presidential elections last year.
Pro-Taylor fighters agree with their former enemies that a war crimes court is not a good idea, said one former pro-government militia commander who still goes by his war name of "General Zig-Zags".
Most of the regular fighters that IRIN spoke with said that they had already asked for forgiveness from their fellow Liberians making a war crimes court redundant.
"After the war some of us went to our towns and villages and begged for pardon. Our people welcomed us and we are all living together in harmony – but a court would divide us and the people," said Andrew Sway, a former child soldier who has returned to school since handing in his gun.
Some of these fighters' former generals, such as General Peanut Butter and General Kai Farley, are legislators in the elected government.
On the streets of Monrovia residents were divided on the issue of a war crimes court, some strongly in favor of seeing war criminals prosecuted, and others eager to put the past behind them and get on with the enormous task of rebuilding the country.
"Liberia suffered too much at the hands of warring parties; they killed us, burned down our towns, and looted our food and homes. If the court will cause them not to repeat their past deeds, then it is a good idea," said Asatu Fahnbulleh, who lost three members of her family in the war.
While Joe Blay, a local physician told IRIN, "This country's concern is not a war crimes court, but development that will bring light, water, good roads and hospitals and rebuild the damaged infrastructure."
MONROVIA, 11 April (IRIN) - With one-time rebel leader and former Liberian president Charles Taylor before a war crimes court in neighbouring Sierra Leone some Liberian youths have begun petitioning their government to set up their own tribunal.
Rebel fighters, many of them children and youths high on drugs and clad in women's wigs and underwear, killed, raped and maimed during 14 years of on-off civil war that ended when Taylor quit power and took exile in August 2003.
But Taylor's days in a seafront mansion courtesy of the Nigerian government abruptly came to an end last month after a rapid succession of developments that culminated with UN peacekeepers handing a cuffed Taylor over to the UN-backed Special Court in Sierra Leone.
Back in Liberia there is an elected government, security is guaranteed by a 15,000-strong UN peacekeeping force and donors are stumping up millions of dollars to rebuild the war-battered country.
And part of that rebuilding must include a war crimes court, say youth groups who want to see the perpetrators of crimes including summary executions, massacres, amputations and rape brought to justice.
"Justice for the people of Liberia can no longer be delayed or denied. The time has come to establish an international criminal tribunal for Liberia," said the Forum for the Establishment of a War Crimes court in Liberia (FEWCCIL) on its petition which they say has received 10,000 signatures of support.
The FEWCCIL last week took the matter to the 94-members of Liberia's newly installed elected government.
"In the interests of genuine lasting peace and reconciliation we call upon this august body to pass an act that establishes the legal framework for the creation of a Special War Crimes Tribunal for Liberia," the FEWCCIL told parliament.
A second group, the Confederation of Monrovia Youth (CMY) told legislatures such a court would end Liberia's culture of impunity.
"Bringing the perpetrators of gruesome atrocities to court would serve as a deterrent to others and end the culture of impunity that exists in this country," the CMY said.
A peace deal thrashed out in the run up to Taylor's 2003 departure called for the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission but Taylor's henchmen and rebel leaders who signed the deal fell short of agreeing to the establishment of a war crimes court.
Liberia's Truth and Reconciliation Commission was officially launched in late February and is mandated to "investigate gross human rights violations and war crimes, including massacres, sexual violence, murder, extra-judicial killings and economic crimes (such as the exploitation of national or public resources to perpetuate the armed conflict)," reads the June 2005 law ratifying the Commission.
The Commission, headed by Liberian human rights activist Jerome Verdier, will begin hearings in July to make a public record of atrocities committed as far back as 1979 – ten years prior to the start of the civil war. Based on their investigations, the Commission cannot try alleged offenders but has the power to recommend cases for prosecution.
Verdier dismissed the calls for a Liberian war crimes court, saying that the calls were being made by people "not well informed of the trend in the peace process."
Talk of a war crimes court has rung alarm bells for others. Sekou Conneh, leader of the largest rebel group – the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) – in the final years of the civil war, denounced the move telling IRIN that "digging up old wounds" would do more harm than good.
"Nearly everyone in this country is guilty of war crimes and we strongly believe that a [war crimes] court would not be in line with restoring peace in Liberia. Frankly, it is not necessary here," said Conneh who also ran unsuccessfully as a presidential candidate in the first round of presidential elections last year.
Pro-Taylor fighters agree with their former enemies that a war crimes court is not a good idea, said one former pro-government militia commander who still goes by his war name of "General Zig-Zags".
Most of the regular fighters that IRIN spoke with said that they had already asked for forgiveness from their fellow Liberians making a war crimes court redundant.
"After the war some of us went to our towns and villages and begged for pardon. Our people welcomed us and we are all living together in harmony – but a court would divide us and the people," said Andrew Sway, a former child soldier who has returned to school since handing in his gun.
Some of these fighters' former generals, such as General Peanut Butter and General Kai Farley, are legislators in the elected government.
On the streets of Monrovia residents were divided on the issue of a war crimes court, some strongly in favor of seeing war criminals prosecuted, and others eager to put the past behind them and get on with the enormous task of rebuilding the country.
"Liberia suffered too much at the hands of warring parties; they killed us, burned down our towns, and looted our food and homes. If the court will cause them not to repeat their past deeds, then it is a good idea," said Asatu Fahnbulleh, who lost three members of her family in the war.
While Joe Blay, a local physician told IRIN, "This country's concern is not a war crimes court, but development that will bring light, water, good roads and hospitals and rebuild the damaged infrastructure."
Liberians call for Own War Crimes Court
VOA 12 April 2006 By Franz Wild Monrovia
A group of Liberians is calling for the establishment of a war crimes court in Liberia. Their country's former president, Charles Taylor, is in custody at the U.N.-backed special court in neighboring Sierra Leone.
The Forum for the Establishment of a War Crimes Court in Liberia is planning a rally next week in Monrovia. It hopes thousands will turn out to support their bid to create a court in Liberia similar to the one in Sierra Leone.
Last week, the forum gave a petition signed by nearly 10,000 people supporting a Liberian court to the speaker of the legislature.
The court would try all of those guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity, committed during the 14 years various rebel militias fought government soldiers and each other. The conflict ended when then-president Charles Taylor took asylum in Nigeria in August 2003.
During the war many civilians were killed, often brutally, and many child soldiers were forced to fight.
Forum Chairman Mulbah Morlu says a war crimes court is a necessity after such a vicious war.
"We witnessed a tremendous exercise of abuse against human rights and violations against international laws," said Morlu. "We felt there was a need to build a consensus for establishing a war crimes court in Liberia."
The forum says most Liberians favor such a court.
The Liberian peace agreement signed in Accra in 2003 made a provision for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to document the causes of the war and investigate human rights violations.
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Chairman, Councilor Jerome Verdier, says the panel will try to piece together what happened during the war when it begins its work in earnest in June. He says the commission is adopting a carefully thought out process, which will address the need for justice in Liberia.
He says there is no need for a Liberian war crimes court.
"What is happening in our view is an emotional outburst brought on by the recent arrest of former president Charles Taylor," said Verdier. "And so people are emotionally charged onto the issue of a war crimes court. I think, it grows out of a disregard or a lack of knowledge of the Liberian peace process."
Verdier promises that the commission will be a part of the campaign to end a culture of impunity in Liberia. This means that in certain cases investigations will lead to the prosecution of those who are believed to have committed particularly serious abuses.
On the streets of Monrovia, opinion is divided on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's potential success and the need for a war crimes court in Liberia.
The eight-story Duko Palace used to be a luxury hotel overlooking the city center. It was abandoned during the war and then used as a refuge by Liberians fleeing the fighting. Years later, about 300 people still live in the dilapidated building.
One of Duko's inhabitants, James Colly, wants to put the war behind him and is worried about problems that a war crimes court could bring with it.
"We are afraid," he said. "Coming out with a war court here in Liberia, we are afraid that it will bring some problems that we are not expecting in Liberia. We really need peace now. Charles Taylor is the person who the government really wanted. Nobody knows what may happen. It is not total peace, it is not totally over. We are now yearning for total peace."
But Colly's neighbor, James Willy, disagrees and strongly favors such a court.
"It would be preferable to have a similar court here," he said. "They should bring everybody to the court, because they all contributed to the destruction of this country. One person cannot fight a war, so they should all be arrested."
Another Duko resident, Wilfred Weed says that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission will just let those who committed atrocities off the hook.
"What I think we need here is a war crimes court, because we have to set a precedent against impunity and a TRC is just like offering an opportunity for people to repeat their actions," he said. "Because when people are not punished for their crimes it gives them encouragement, it gives them motivation to repeat their actions. So, I do not think the TRC will serve any better."
Lawmakers have not indicated whether they would back a proposal for a Liberian war crimes court.
From the Forum for the Establishment of a War Crimes Court in Liberia, Boakai Jaliba says he would not be surprised if there are members of parliament who will not back the idea.
"A number of our elite may have some apprehensions about a war crimes court in Liberia, because throughout the 15 years of conflict, a number of them had their hands tainted and entangled in the war process, so to tell them that look we want to have a war crimes court in Liberia is like a man shooting his own toe," he noted.
In the event that the legislature does not give its support, the forum is simultaneously lobbying foreign governments and the United Nations
A group of Liberians is calling for the establishment of a war crimes court in Liberia. Their country's former president, Charles Taylor, is in custody at the U.N.-backed special court in neighboring Sierra Leone.
The Forum for the Establishment of a War Crimes Court in Liberia is planning a rally next week in Monrovia. It hopes thousands will turn out to support their bid to create a court in Liberia similar to the one in Sierra Leone.
Last week, the forum gave a petition signed by nearly 10,000 people supporting a Liberian court to the speaker of the legislature.
The court would try all of those guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity, committed during the 14 years various rebel militias fought government soldiers and each other. The conflict ended when then-president Charles Taylor took asylum in Nigeria in August 2003.
During the war many civilians were killed, often brutally, and many child soldiers were forced to fight.
Forum Chairman Mulbah Morlu says a war crimes court is a necessity after such a vicious war.
"We witnessed a tremendous exercise of abuse against human rights and violations against international laws," said Morlu. "We felt there was a need to build a consensus for establishing a war crimes court in Liberia."
The forum says most Liberians favor such a court.
The Liberian peace agreement signed in Accra in 2003 made a provision for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to document the causes of the war and investigate human rights violations.
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Chairman, Councilor Jerome Verdier, says the panel will try to piece together what happened during the war when it begins its work in earnest in June. He says the commission is adopting a carefully thought out process, which will address the need for justice in Liberia.
He says there is no need for a Liberian war crimes court.
"What is happening in our view is an emotional outburst brought on by the recent arrest of former president Charles Taylor," said Verdier. "And so people are emotionally charged onto the issue of a war crimes court. I think, it grows out of a disregard or a lack of knowledge of the Liberian peace process."
Verdier promises that the commission will be a part of the campaign to end a culture of impunity in Liberia. This means that in certain cases investigations will lead to the prosecution of those who are believed to have committed particularly serious abuses.
On the streets of Monrovia, opinion is divided on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's potential success and the need for a war crimes court in Liberia.
The eight-story Duko Palace used to be a luxury hotel overlooking the city center. It was abandoned during the war and then used as a refuge by Liberians fleeing the fighting. Years later, about 300 people still live in the dilapidated building.
One of Duko's inhabitants, James Colly, wants to put the war behind him and is worried about problems that a war crimes court could bring with it.
"We are afraid," he said. "Coming out with a war court here in Liberia, we are afraid that it will bring some problems that we are not expecting in Liberia. We really need peace now. Charles Taylor is the person who the government really wanted. Nobody knows what may happen. It is not total peace, it is not totally over. We are now yearning for total peace."
But Colly's neighbor, James Willy, disagrees and strongly favors such a court.
"It would be preferable to have a similar court here," he said. "They should bring everybody to the court, because they all contributed to the destruction of this country. One person cannot fight a war, so they should all be arrested."
Another Duko resident, Wilfred Weed says that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission will just let those who committed atrocities off the hook.
"What I think we need here is a war crimes court, because we have to set a precedent against impunity and a TRC is just like offering an opportunity for people to repeat their actions," he said. "Because when people are not punished for their crimes it gives them encouragement, it gives them motivation to repeat their actions. So, I do not think the TRC will serve any better."
Lawmakers have not indicated whether they would back a proposal for a Liberian war crimes court.
From the Forum for the Establishment of a War Crimes Court in Liberia, Boakai Jaliba says he would not be surprised if there are members of parliament who will not back the idea.
"A number of our elite may have some apprehensions about a war crimes court in Liberia, because throughout the 15 years of conflict, a number of them had their hands tainted and entangled in the war process, so to tell them that look we want to have a war crimes court in Liberia is like a man shooting his own toe," he noted.
In the event that the legislature does not give its support, the forum is simultaneously lobbying foreign governments and the United Nations
Notes on Distribution Collection of TRC Call for Nominations
August 24, 2005
At present the selection panel for the truth and reconciliation commission (TRC) commissioners is publicizing the call for nominations. The panel is chaired by the ECOWAS Ambassador and has six other members, two from political parties, three from civil society and the director of the Human Rights and Protection Section.
Any person or institution in Liberia or the Diaspora may make nominations and in an effort to make the process as transparent and participatory as possible Civil Affairs and Human Rights officers have been asked to assist in spreading the message to the hinterland. The deadline for nominations is Saturday 3 September at 2.00pm. We would appreciate your assistance in distributing the call and organizing for nominations to be transported back to Monrovia immediately after and delivered directly to the ECOWAS offices in Congo Town.
The following are some points to note:
1. Please give copies of the call to your Superintendent for him to distribute
2. Please distribute the call as widely as possible during your daily activities in your county.
3. Please, if you have enough paper, distribute the attached summary of the TRC Act and try to inform those whom you distribute to of what the commission is and what it will do.
4. Please emphasize that the call for nominations to the TRC is not connected to the elections.
5. Those who wish to make nominations should bring their nomination to either Civil Affairs or Human Rights offices in an envelope.
6. Where available, Human Rights Officers will be responsible for transportation of nominations to ECOWAS offices, Monrovia. If not, Civil Affairs officers must make arrangements for prompt transportation.
7. The deadline for nominations is Saturday 3 September at 2.00pm. The list of all nominations will be published in newspapers on Wednesday 6 September, so they must be returned before that date.
8. If Civil Affairs officers are unable to travel, they must give the nominations to the next staff member returning to Monrovia to take to ECOWAS offices.
9. Attached is a form that must be filled out to show receipt of nominations. It must be signed by those who deliver the nomination (not necessarily the person or group who has made the nomination) and countersigned by the Civil Affairs or Human Rights Officer who receives it. It should be delivered to ECOWAS along with the nominations.
At present the selection panel for the truth and reconciliation commission (TRC) commissioners is publicizing the call for nominations. The panel is chaired by the ECOWAS Ambassador and has six other members, two from political parties, three from civil society and the director of the Human Rights and Protection Section.
Any person or institution in Liberia or the Diaspora may make nominations and in an effort to make the process as transparent and participatory as possible Civil Affairs and Human Rights officers have been asked to assist in spreading the message to the hinterland. The deadline for nominations is Saturday 3 September at 2.00pm. We would appreciate your assistance in distributing the call and organizing for nominations to be transported back to Monrovia immediately after and delivered directly to the ECOWAS offices in Congo Town.
The following are some points to note:
1. Please give copies of the call to your Superintendent for him to distribute
2. Please distribute the call as widely as possible during your daily activities in your county.
3. Please, if you have enough paper, distribute the attached summary of the TRC Act and try to inform those whom you distribute to of what the commission is and what it will do.
4. Please emphasize that the call for nominations to the TRC is not connected to the elections.
5. Those who wish to make nominations should bring their nomination to either Civil Affairs or Human Rights offices in an envelope.
6. Where available, Human Rights Officers will be responsible for transportation of nominations to ECOWAS offices, Monrovia. If not, Civil Affairs officers must make arrangements for prompt transportation.
7. The deadline for nominations is Saturday 3 September at 2.00pm. The list of all nominations will be published in newspapers on Wednesday 6 September, so they must be returned before that date.
8. If Civil Affairs officers are unable to travel, they must give the nominations to the next staff member returning to Monrovia to take to ECOWAS offices.
9. Attached is a form that must be filled out to show receipt of nominations. It must be signed by those who deliver the nomination (not necessarily the person or group who has made the nomination) and countersigned by the Civil Affairs or Human Rights Officer who receives it. It should be delivered to ECOWAS along with the nominations.
TRC call for nominations
August 13, 2005
The Office of the Special Representative of the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS in Liberia has announced on 10 August 2005 the call for nominations for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) beginning August 11, 2005. The Selection Panel has invited nominations from all sectors of the Liberian Society, including but not limited to civil society, civil society organizations, political parties, professional organizations, private and public institutions, Liberians in the Diaspora, citizens, and the general public. Persons nominated must meet the legal criteria. The process will last three weeks and we will be organising radio programmes, community outreach and publication in newspapers.
As part of this process, please could you distribute this call and also give it to your Civil Affairs counterparts to distribute. The call ends on 3 September and it is very important that we try inform those in inaccessible areas. Nominations should then be brought to you at your offices and you will be responsible for bringing them back to Monrovia at the end of the process. Please carry copies with you during your daily activities and distribute them. In particular, if you have time, please give copies to your County Superintendent.
The Office of the Special Representative of the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS in Liberia has announced on 10 August 2005 the call for nominations for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) beginning August 11, 2005. The Selection Panel has invited nominations from all sectors of the Liberian Society, including but not limited to civil society, civil society organizations, political parties, professional organizations, private and public institutions, Liberians in the Diaspora, citizens, and the general public. Persons nominated must meet the legal criteria. The process will last three weeks and we will be organising radio programmes, community outreach and publication in newspapers.
As part of this process, please could you distribute this call and also give it to your Civil Affairs counterparts to distribute. The call ends on 3 September and it is very important that we try inform those in inaccessible areas. Nominations should then be brought to you at your offices and you will be responsible for bringing them back to Monrovia at the end of the process. Please carry copies with you during your daily activities and distribute them. In particular, if you have time, please give copies to your County Superintendent.
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